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CHAPTER ONE 
 
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON WORK. 
   
 1.1 General Introduction 
 
The term “globalisation“ is not easy to define given the fact that in most instances the 
definition has been contextualised. For the purpose of this work, the following definition 
will be helpful: 
 “…increase in cross-border economic interdependency resulting from a greater mobility of 
factors of production and of goods and services has established linkages over a broader 
geography of location. This trend is reflective of an increasing economic liberalisation and falling 
tariff barriers, modern communications, free flow of capital and modern technologies, integrated 
financial markets and corporate strategies of multinational companies that operate on the 
premises of homogenous world market”1  
  
What is evident from the above definition with regard to production is that globalisation 
has greatly altered the manner in which the production of goods is being done. Hitherto, 
the production process was organised in such a way that the industralised countries 
produced manufactured goods while the developing or non-industralised countries 
supplied raw materials and acted as markets for the products of the industralised 
countries2. The production process has undergone an ongoing transformation from the 
large-scale production techniques which were based on the assembly line models, to the 
more flexible methods of production: the result being the emergence of a global division 
of labour in production which is characterised by the fragmentation of the production 
process and its subsequent geographical relocation on a global scale in a way that cuts 
across national boundaries.3 
 
                                                 
1 Harbrige, R et al. “Globalisation and Labour Market Deregulation in Australia and New Zealand, 
Different Approaches, Similar Outcome” (2002) 24 Employee Relations Journal at p424.  
2 Dicken Global Shift 3ed (2003) p9.  
3 Ibid. 
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Changes in the production process as a result of globalisation have had significant impact 
on labour relations.  
First, they have adversely affected the unskilled workers, while the skilled workers, on 
the other hand, are benefiting from the spoils thereof.4 Today, as a result of globalisation, 
skilled employees are able to be relatively more mobile and command higher wages 
because in most cases they are in the managerial and technical positions which require 
greater knowledge than unskilled or illiterate employees5 who lack the knowledge 
required in our new technologically driven world of work. Furthermore, the unskilled 
employees usually form the bulk of the subcontracted labourforce, who are poorly paid 
and whose jobs are not only unstable but also fall outside the scope of collective 
representation or traditional labour regulation. 
Secondly, globalisation has resulted in a decline in wages and conditions of employment 
as states engage in a “race to the bottom”. As a result of international competition, states 
have been engaged in deregulation of the labour market in a bid to attract foreign 
investors. 
Furthermore, unemployment rates as well as poor quality jobs especially in the informal 
sector have also increased as a result of globalisation. 
 
 
1.2 The South African Context 
 
Prior to the last three decades, employment patterns were based on a full-time permanent 
basis. Today, as a result of globalisation, and the employer’s quest for flexibility, the 
result has been the emergence of non-standard work arrangements. Globalisation has 
promoted the development of non-standard employment patterns through international 
networks of enterprises, which favour a diversity of contractual arrangements between 
                                                 
4 Jenkins et al “The Quest for a Fair Globalisation Three Years On; Assessing the Impact of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation” (2007) p17. 
5 Baskin, J “South Africa’s Quest for Job, Growth and Equity in a Global Context” (1998), 19ILJ 986- 
1001. p967 
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capital and labour. The re-entry of South Africa into the global economy meant that it 
will not be left out of the global market and its resultant consequences6. 
  
The rationale for employers resorting to non-standard employment arrangements is 
simply to enhance enterprise flexibility and also to avoid the obligations associated with a 
standard employment contract: resorting to non-standard employment arrangements will 
reduce an employer’s labour costs as social benefits, such as, medical aid and pension 
fund, will no longer be the obligations of the employer.  
 
The problem with a non- standard employment pattern is largely that those employed 
under such contracts in most cases fall outside the regulatory net of traditional labour 
law. Some, however, do fall within the traditional regulatory net of labour law, but the 
nature of their job is so informal that it becomes difficult for them to be recruited into any 
collective organisation or to benefit from the protection of the law.7  
 
Traditional labour law does not adequately protect atypical employees for two reasons. 
First, traditional labour law was based on a model of fulltime life-time employment with 
one employer, which is ill-suited to atypical employment patterns. Secondly, the various 
forms which atypical employment take mean that some workers, like independent 
contractors, cannot be considered as employees and as such cannot benefit from the 
protective reach of traditional labour law8.   
 
 This chapter examines the different forms of employment patterns that have emerged as 
a result of globalisation as well as the mechanisms that have been used by the legislator 
to accommodate those in non-standard employment relationships. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Hepple, B. “Labour Relations Act and Global Competitiveness” (2005)  9 Law, Democracy and 
Development 135- 145 at p137.  
7 Cheadle, H. “Regulated Flexibility, Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA” (2006) 27 ILJ 663 at p699. 
 
8 Ibid.  
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1.2.1     Globalisation and the changing nature of employment patterns 
 
The traditional model of employment patterns based on a model of fulltime life-time 
employment with one employer has also felt the pinch of globalisation. Today we see the 
growth of non-standard employment patterns due to casualisation, externalisation and 
informalisation of work9. 
 
1.2.1.1 Casualisation 
Casualisation refers to the use of part-time10 and temporary workers11 and leads to the 
reduction in the number of fulltime employees12. Over the past two decades there has 
been an increase in the use of casual labour in the South African workforce. In recent 
years not less than 82.5 % of firms in South Africa have employed casuals13.  
 
Casualisation is a problem for various reasons. It fragments the labour force into 
permanent and non-permanent employees. The latter group of employees is usually 
poorly paid14, and have little or no training and development opportunities. A study by 
the ILO reveals that while about 69.1 % of standard workers are covered by pension 
funds, only about 23.5 % of part-time and 8.9% of temporary employees are covered by 
such funds; the percentage for medical schemes stands at 74.9 %, 30.3% and 11.9 % 
respectively15. Furthermore, these employees have little or no industrial protection 
because their interests are not usually represented by trade unions. Unions are usually 
reluctant to represent this category of employee because they believe that their focus and 
source of income lie with those with standard employment relationships16. Finally, 
casualisation is also characterised by employment insecurity, as approximately 55 % of 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 This refers to work which is not full time.  
11 A” Temporary work” refers to an employment relationship based on a contract for a definite period of 
time and which comes to an end when the period expires.  
12 Fenwick,C et al. “Labour Law; A Southern African Perspective” (2007) p19. 
13 Standing G et al “Restructuring the Labour Market; the South African Challenge” (1996).  
14 These employees are usually poorly paid compared to standard workers and rarely benefit from non-
wage company benefits. 
15 Makino, K. “The Changing Nature of Employment and the Reform of Labour and Social Security 
Legislation in Post Apartheid South Africa.” (2008)  IDE Discussion Paper. 
16 Fenwick,C  et al op cit, p20. It is also very difficult for unions to recruit and organise casuals due to the 
nature of their job. 
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firms that employ this category of employee on a contractual basis usually end up not 
renewing the contract17. 
 
Casualisation can be explained by three factors.  
First, employers prefer this form of employment pattern to the standard employment 
pattern because of their desire for flexibility in the labour market18, such as, the extension 
of working hours during peak periods to increase productivity, to reduce labour costs19, 
and to increase efficiency.  
Furthermore, the increase in the use of these employees can also be explained by the high 
rate of unemployment in the country which forces people to engage in less desirable 
employment patterns.  
Finally, such form of employment pattern is seen as a bridge to standard employment in 
the future.20 Employees engage in such casual labour so as to acquire the necessary 
experience that will enable them to get fulltime employment. 
 
1.2.1.2 Externalisation 
This refers to the process whereby employment is regulated by a commercial contract 
instead of a contract of employment21. Thus, these workers are described as externals 
because they fall outside the organisation that is making use of their services.22 A 
remarkable feature of this form of employment pattern is that it reduces the number of 
workers employed by the core business and as such limits the application of labour law.23 
.  
Externalisation is usually justified on the ground that firms should concentrate on their 
core functions; those activities in which they have gained comparative advantage.24 
                                                 
17  Standing et al. op cit. Non-renewal of such contract were the employee reasonably expects its renewal 
will constitute unfair dismissal under the LRA.  
18 “Flexibility” here refers to numerical flexibility which entails little or no cost in hiring and firing of 
workers. 
19 Bondibe, O. ”The Extent and Effects of Causualisation in Southern Africa; Analysis of Lesotho, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe” (2006). NALEDI. at  p10. 
20 Standing et al, op cit. 
21 Fenwick,C et al op cit. p 20. 
22 Owen C et al “Strategic Alliances and the New World of Work.”  
23 Fenwick,C et al op cit p 20. 
24 Ibid. 
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However, the real motive behind such arrangement is that employers want to avoid the 
responsibilities associated with standard employment patterns, such as, the payment of 
social benefits25and the cost involved in the event of a dismissal claim.  
 
Externalisation has various facets. 
There is outsourcing were the employer retrenches employees performing non-core 
functions26 of the enterprise and enters into a contract with another firm for it to perform 
the non-core functions27. By contracting out such services, the employer shifts 
responsibility for bargaining entitlement and common law rights to the contractor28. 
Given the level of union density29 in the country, firms will prefer to outsource so as to 
avoid the high cost of unionised labour.  
 
Externalisation also occurs through the use of labour brokers.  Here, the employer of an 
enterprise gets its labour through a commercial contract with a third party.30  Labour 
brokering is distinguishable from other form of externalised labour in two ways: it 
involves the provision of a temporary worker to a client, and also work is usually being 
done on the premises of the client31. Labour brokers have been criticised for violating 
minimum labour standards, like hours of work and minimum wages an employee is 
supposed to receive, and also for conspiring with the client because they obtain cheap and 
easily disposable labour for their use.32 
 
Franchising also is another form of externalisation, which involves the franchisor 
authorising the franchisee to operate a business using the franchisors’ trade mark, and the 
franchisee in turn employs workers to assist him to operate the business. The franchisor, 
                                                 
25 Fenwick,C et al. op cit, p 21. 
26 Fenwick et al op cit. p20. 
27 NEHAWU  v. University of Cape Town & Others (2003) 12 BCLR 154 (CC). 
28 Owen C et al “Strategic Alliances And The New World Of Work”. Such practices are believed to 
improve service delivery. 
29 Bhorat, H. et al. The South African Labour Market in a Globalising World; Economic and Legislative 
Consideration (2002). Unionisation rate stands at about 34%. This figure is relative high given that the 
average unionisation rate for developing countries is approximately 18 %.  
30  Theron, J. “Intermediary or Employer? Labour Brokers and the Triangular Employment Relationship”. 
(2005) 26 ILJ 618 at p618. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Standing et al op cit p 96. 
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however, has power over the business with regard to employment and labour related 
matters. The recruitment of workers, however, is left in the hands of the franchisee33. 
 
Home-work or outwork is also an activity which is usually brokered through an 
intermediary. The intermediary in such a situation has no intention of providing the work 
himself, rather he employs workers to do the job since it will be comparatively cheaper 
than if it were done at the core business34. A case in point can be found in the clothing 
industry were home workers are used.35 
 
From the foregoing it is apparent that externalisation usually involves triangulation36 and 
usually involves situations in which the real employer does not control the employment 
relationship.37  What is strange about this scenario is that, under the law, the user 
enterprise or core business is considered as the third party, thus sending the message that 
the employment is existing only between the intermediary and the worker38. This is at 
odds with common knowledge because it is the client who determines what quantity of 
labour it needs and in most cases work is usually being done at the client’s premises, thus 
giving him a prominent role in the relationship. Basically, the designation of the client as 
a third party implies that in a situation where the intermediary becomes insolvent, the 
workers might end up not being paid. 
 
1.2.1.3 Informalisation  
Informalisation is a situation whereby an employee who is covered by the law cannot 
enforce his rights or where activities take place outside the scope of formal regulation39. 
                                                 
33 Theron, J op cit p 620. 
34 Ibid.  
35  Ibid. 
36Fenwick,C et al, op cit p21.Triangulation involves a process whereby the client or better still the core 
business enters into a commercial contract with an intermediary for work to be done on behalf of the client. 
The intermediary in turn employs workers to perform the job for the client. 
37 Benjamin, P. “Labour Market Regulation: International and South African Perspectives” (2005) HSRC. 
38 Theron, J op cit. p 619. 
39 Theron, J “Informalisation From Above, Informalisation From Below; What Are The Options For 
Organisation”. (2007). 
http://blogs.uct.ac.za/gallery/679/Informalisation%20from%20above,%20informalisation%20from%20belo
w_jt_4_03_2008.pdf. (Accessed on 18 April 2009). 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
The driving force behind this process of informalisation has been the quest of employers 
to achieve flexibility so as to remain competitive in the global market. This has been 
achieved either by changing the internal organisation of the labour force, changing the 
work process, or changing the employment status of the workforce.40 Informalisation in 
some cases involves small businesses that are not registered and are run from street 
pavements and in other informal arrangements41. 
 
Informalisation also involves the use of independent contractors. The employer uses a 
person’s services through a contract of service rather than through the common law 
contract of employment42. In order to avoid the responsibilities associated with being an 
employer, employers nowadays convert employees into independent contractors or 
contract out work formerly done by employees.43 In practice the distinction between an 
employee (one who benefits from the protection of labour law) and independent 
contractor (one who is not entitled to labour law protection) seems to be that easy. The 
main difference between the two is that an employee works for an employer and is under 
the employer’s control and supervision unlike an independent contractor who performs a 
service for a fee, does not work for a single employer and consequently is not under the 
supervision and control of an employer.44 However, in some circumstances to distinguish 
an employee from an independent contractor at times is very complex. Because of the 
complexity that may arise in the distinction of these sets of workers, several criteria have 
been used to differentiate an independent contractor from an employee.  
 
The first of such tests is the control test which looks at the extent to which an employee is 
subordinated to an employer in terms of the common law contract of employment. 
According to this test an essential ingredient in an employment relationship is the power 
                                                 
40 Fenwick,C et al op cit p 18. 
41 Pillay, D. “Globalisation and The Informalisation ff Labour; the Case Of South Africa” p 6. 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_scpolitics/documents/gwcprojectPapers/South_African_Labou
r.pdf , (Accessed on 18 April 2009). 
42 Cheadle,H et al. South African Constitutional Law, the Bill of Rights. (1997) at p18-7. A person who 
provides services under a contract of work can not be regarded as an employee except in special 
circumstances.  
43 Du Toit et al ,Labour Relations Law, A Comprehensive Guide  (2003) p 77 
44 Du Toit et al , Labour Relations Law, A Comprehensive Guide  (2006) p 75. See p 10. 
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that an employer has to choose what work is to be done but also the manner in which it 
should be done. R V. AMCA Services Ltd45 . Where an employer exerts this power an 
employment relationship will be deemed to exist.  
 
There is also the organisation or integration test which looks at whether the person works 
as part and parcel of the organisation or whether the work done for the business is not 
integrated into the business but merely an accessory to the business. Bank voor Handel en 
Scheepvaart NV v Slatford46  Where the work done is just an accessory to the business, an 
employment relationship will not be found to exist. 
 
Finally, there is the dominant impression test. This test takes no single factor as decisive 
but looks at the relationship as a whole to arrive at a dominant impression to see if there 
is an employment relationship or if it is just a contract to perform an independent 
service.47  
 
1.2.2 Accommodation of non-standard employees under the South African labour 
dispensation and its limits 
 
Conventionally, employees’ protection was based on the notion of an employment 
relationship which differentiated between employees and independent contractors.48 The 
emergence of non-standard employment relationships necessitated the reconstruction of 
the initial framework of labour law so as to accommodate those in an atypical 
employment relationship. The South African legislator has devised various means to 
extend labour law protection to those in a non-standard employment relationship.  
 
First, in an attempt to broaden the safety net so as to accommodate the needs of those in 
an atypical employment relationship, the legislator, instead of amending the definition of 
                                                 
45 1959 (4) SA 208 (A). What is required here is not absolute control, but simple immediate and recurring 
control. 
46 (1953) 1QB 248 (CA). 
 
47Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979  (1) SA 51 (A). 
48 Benjamin, P. op cit p9. 
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“employee”, has introduced a rebuttable presumption which if activated, shifts the burden 
onto the employer to prove that the worker is not an employee. The listed grounds which  
activate the presumption are set out in s200A of the Labour Relations Act (LRA)49 and 
s83A50 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA).51 A worker who succeeds in 
proving just one of such factors is presumed to be an employee irrespective of the form of 
the contract52. This provision of the law offers great protection for those in de facto 
employment relationships because where one or more of the listed grounds is proven the 
burden shifts to the employer to challenge the presumption that the worker is in fact not 
an employee. Besides, the provision is laudable because it applies to all contracts of 
employment irrespective of the form53 that the contract might take. Although the courts 
are required to go beyond the words of the contract in determining the existence of an 
employment relationship54, an employer can be able to rebut the presumption and thus 
leave the worker unprotected. Thus, the presumption may at times not be able to offer 
protection to workers that need it most. A further limit to the presumption is to be found 
under the provisions of s 200 A (2) which provide that the presumption does not apply to 
any employee who earns more than the limit set by the Minister in terms of s6 (3) of the 
BCEA. Finally, the effectiveness of the presumption remains in doubt because the 
problem with disguised employment patterns is one of enforcement of the law55. 
 
The protection of employees employed by a Temporary Employment Service (TES) also 
is a major challenge. This difficulty arises from the fact that employees of a TES usually 
work for a client, who purchases labour from the TES. This difficulty has been regulated 
                                                 
49 Act 66 of 1995. 
50 They include; “The manner in which the person works is subject to the control or supervision of another 
person, the persons’ hour of work is subject to the control or supervision of another person, in the case of a 
person who works for an organisation, the person is part of that organisation, the person has worked for that 
other person for at least 40 hours per month over the last three month, the person is economically 
dependent for that other person for whom that person works or renders services, the person is provided with 
tools of trade by the other person, the person only works for or render services to the one person”. 
51 Act 75 of 1997. Though under a service contract, independent contractors may be deemed employees as 
per the provision of this section. 
52 Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd V. Manqele (2005) 26 ILJ (SA) 749 LAC. The mere fact that an employee needs to 
provo only one of such factor before being considered an employee kind of give him enough shield against 
an employers’ claim. 
53 Du Toit et al op cit p79.  
54 Eg, Medical Association of  SA V. Minister of Health (1997) 18 ILJ 528 (LC).  
55 Fenwick,C et al, op cit.  p 23. 
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in s 198 of the LRA and s 82 of the BCEA. These sections provide that a person who 
works for the client is the employee of the TES and the TES is thus his employer. The 
implication of this provision is that in case of any problem the employee will raise the 
protection offered to employees against the TES, and not against the client56.  
Such legislative provision does not accord adequate protection to the employees by 
designating the TES as employer. First, by designating the TES as employer, it implies 
that the client is a third party in the relationship and as such gives the impression that the 
primary relationship is between the TES and the worker, despite the fact that it is the 
client who determines the amount of labour that it needs. Besides, if the client does not 
want the service on offer, an employment relationship will not exist between a TES and 
the employee, although the work is being done at the client’s workplace.57 Furthermore, 
the fact that the work is being done at the client’s workplace suggest that he has powers 
over the worker who the law does not consider it’s employee. By designating the TES as 
employer, the law does in fact fail to adequately protect the worker. Another loophole of 
such a provision is also evidenced by the fact that the terms of the contract (commercial) 
between the TES and the client are usually not disclosed to the employee. Hence, it is 
difficult to think that employees can improve working conditions through the process of 
collective bargaining between employer and employees, except in cases where the TES is 
able to advance its demand with the client by varying the content of the contract58. From 
what has been said so far, one sees that by designating the TES as employer leaves 
employees with little or no protection. Except in the case of unfair dismissal, s198 (4) of 
the LRA provides that the TES and the client will be jointly and severally liable where 
the TES breaches the terms and conditions of employment provided for by a collective 
agreement, an award or the provisions of the BCEA. 
 
Section 57 (1) of the Employment Equity Act (EEA)59 provides that where a TES places 
a worker to a client indefinitely or for more than three months, the worker is deemed to 
                                                 
56 Ibid  
57 Theron, J. (2005) op cit p619.  
58 Theron, j. op cit p629. 
59 Act 55 of 1998. 
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be  the employee of the client60 for purposes of affirmative action; section 57 (2), on its 
part provides that the TES and the client will be jointly and severally liable where the 
TES commits an act of unfair discrimination on the instruction of the client. This 
provision is laudable because it at least makes the client liable and as such will force him 
to comply with labour regulations. This provision impliedly accepts the fact that the 
client has control over the workplace and as such directly or indirectly influences the 
terms and conditions of employment on which the employee is recruited. However, given 
the precarious nature of workers in temporary employment agencies and the low level of 
unionisation among them, workers in this category find it difficult to benefit from this 
protection offered by the law. Furthermore, the law does not make the client liable in case 
of unfair dismissal, although the continuance of an employment relationship depends on 
the decision of the client who is usually the one to initiate the decision to terminate the 
employment relationship.61 Besides, the reason for dismissal by the TES will obviously 
be the one that the client must have forwarded to the TES. 
 
Section 83 of the BCEA gives the Minister of Labour the power to deem certain 
categories of workers to be employees for the purposes of the Act or any other 
employment law. Section 51 of the BCEA likewise gives the Minister the power to deem 
certain categories of workers as employees when making a Sectoral Determination. These 
sections of the law have not yet been applied by the Minister.62 
 
Finally, s 32 of the LRA provides for the extension63 of collective bargaining agreements 
to non-members of a bargaining council. Though seen as a limitation on freedom of 
association, the extension of bargaining council agreements to non-members of a council 
is one of the ways of protecting atypical and unorganised employees who by the nature of 
their work cannot engage in collective bargaining. Such extension will mean that atypical 
                                                 
60 This is limited to purposes of chapter 3 of the Employment Equity Act. 
61 Theron, J. op cit p 637. The TES will scarcely want to terminate the employment relationship because it 
is in its interest, at least financially, that the relationship continues. 
62Vettori, M “Alternative Means To Regulate The Employment Relationship In The Changing World Of 
Work” (2005) at p243 
63 This provides that were an agreement has been reached in the bargaining council of an industry, the 
outcome of that agreement can be extended to other members of that industry who were not party to the 
agreement. 
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employees who are not members of a bargaining council will be covered by agreements 
concluded at the bargaining council. An example of a bargaining council agreement 
which has been extended to non-members of the council can be seen in the bargaining 
council agreements for the restaurant, catering and allied trades which are binding not 
only on employers and employees who are members of the council but also on all 
employers and employees in those trades64. Even where such agreements have been 
extended, it has not been easy for bargaining councils to control the enterprises65.  
 
To conclude, the emergence of non-standard employment relationships has rendered the 
protection of such employees a difficult task. The legislator has extended protection to 
some categories of atypical employees with the exception of genuine independent 
contractors66 and employees working less than twenty four hours a month67. Even where 
such protection is extended, there are usually grey areas in the law which the employers 
often exploit to the detriment of atypical workers, an example being the designation of a 
TES as employer.  
                                                      
 
 
 
                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Department of labour. http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=87201. (Accessed on 16/ 
o5/ 09). 
65Vettori, M op cit. p242. 
66 This category of workers cannot benefit from the protection accorded to employees because South 
African labour law is premised on the notion of a contract of employment. Where the relation between an 
independent contractor and an employer is not based on a contract of employment, the said individual can 
not benefit from the protection of the law. 
67 This is so because ss 6 (c), 19, 28 and of the BCEA does not cover employees working less than 24 hours 
a month for an employer. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
             GLOBALISATION AND FLEXIBLE WORKING CONDITIONS. 
 
Globalisation has impacted on industrial regulation throughout the world. Some of these 
changes are visible in the present state of working conditions of employees. Globalisation 
has pushed states around the globe to be engaged in what has been termed “a race to the 
bottom”, in an attempt to make national industries more competitive in the global market. 
This so-called “race to the bottom” implies a flexible, and at times an outright 
deregulation of the, labour market; signaling of course an erosion of working conditions 
of employees. The South African labour market has of course not been left out of this 
global race.  
 
2.1   The Notion of Flexibility 
The concept of flexibility has been given different meanings by employers, employees 
and even the government. To an employer the notion of flexibility entails the power to 
make changes easily and at little or no cost so as to meet up with market demand68. To 
employees the concept of flexibility means the ability to easily adjust working time and 
also push forward their demands69. Employees, however, view flexibility as having an 
implication of insecurity70. They thus see legislation as a means of enhancing security. It 
should also be noted that there is a nexus between flexibility and unemployment: where 
unemployment is high, flexibility could easily be attained and vice versa.                              
For the government flexibility refers to the extent to which variation of a rule is 
permitted71. 
 
That said, it would be worthwhile at this point to discuss the different forms of flexibility.  
Employment flexibility refers to the ability to change employment levels cheaply and 
quickly.   There is wage flexibility which refers to the freedom to change wage levels 
                                                 
68 Benjamin, P. Labour Market Regulation, International and South African Perspectives (2005) at p 21. 
69 G, Standing et al op cit p 6. 
70 Benjamin, P. ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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without any restriction and includes individulisation of wages and the different forms of 
performance-linked wages. Functional flexibility refers to the ability to alter working 
conditions, work processes, etc easily and cheaply.72 
 
In its attempt to reform the labour market so as to align it with the demands of 
globalisation (flexibility in the labour market), the South African legislator opted for 
what has been termed “regulated flexibility’73 taking into account the employers need for 
flexibility and the employees’ need for security. The legislator had to satisfy both the 
employers and employees who criticised the 1983 BCEA as being inflexible, in that it 
granted for very little scope for the regulation of working time to suit particular needs74. 
At the heart of this concept of regulated flexibility is the acceptance of the fact that the 
labour market is dynamic and diverse – thus, it gives room for employers and employees 
to set rules which are compatible with their sector or workplace75. 
 
2.2 Flexibility in working time  
 
Flexibility in working time refers to the extent to which the law gives room for employers 
and employees to alter the standard working time to suit their operational needs.  
Employees demand flexibility in working time arrangements so as to be able to achieve a 
better work/life balance76. To this end, we are going to examine how globalisation and 
the resultant quest for flexibility in the labour market have led to the emergence of non-
standard working time arrangements and how the law permits variation of the standard 
working time model so as to permit employers to arrange their working time to suit their 
operational demands and as such stay competitive in the global market. 
 
 
                                                 
72 Ibid. 
73 Cheadle, H. “Regulated Flexibility; Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA” (2006) 27 ILJ P669. This 
concept is characterised by various mechanisms such as:  voice law, administrative discretions guided by 
guide lines as to how this discretion is to be used; administrative determination; and finally soft law like a 
Code of Good Practice. 
74 Du Toit et al, op cit p 509.  
75 Op cit p669.  
76 Benjamin, P. op cit p 22. 
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2.2.1    The Emergence of Non-Standard Working Time Arrangements 
 
Prior to the advent of globalisation, work was arranged based on the standard working 
time model. Under such model, employees were expected to work for a forty-six hours 
per week77 mostly from Monday to Friday. The normal working hours were during the 
day; work performed at night78 and during week-ends was subject to a premium payment 
to the employees. Overtime work also attracted a premium.  
Today, things seem to have taken a different turn as can be seen from the provisions of 
the BCEA79 which regulates working time. The quest for a flexible working environment 
has given room for the distortion of the standard working time model. This has been 
achieved in the BCEA through various means as seen below. 
 
2.2.1.1 Compressed Working Week and Averaging Working Hours 
 
Sections 11 and 12 of the BCEA provide for the compressing and averaging, respectively 
of an employees’ working time. The rationale for such provisions is to enable an 
employer to adjust working time to suit his fluctuating needs, and as such improve 
productivity.80  
 
Section 11 provides for employees’ working hours to be compressed. Under this 
mechanism, employees’ ordinary working hours may be varied either by collective 
agreement or written individual agreement to enable the employee to work a compressed 
working week. An employee may thus work for up to twelve (12) hours a day (including 
meal interval) without receiving over-time pay, provided that the maximum weekly 
working hours (45 hours) remain unchanged. Any overtime worked as a result of the 
compression of the working week does not attract any premium, except in cases where 
the employee had worked for more than the statutory maximum in a week or the 
                                                 
77 This is the provision of the 1983 BCEA. 
78 The 1983 BCEA allowed women to do night work, which hitherto had been forbidden. 
79 Act. 75 of 1997 
80 Du Toit, D et al,  Labour Relations Law, A Comprehensive Guide (2006)  p525. 
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maximum period agreed in a collective agreement. An employee whose weekly hours 
have been compressed is not expected to work for more than forty- five ordinary hours 
and ten hours overtime in a week. 
 
Flexibility has also been achieved through the averaging of working hours through 
collective agreement as per the provisions of s12 of the BCEA. This section permits the 
averaging of an employee’s maximum ordinary hours and overtime hours for a period 
longer than one week but not exceeding four months. Employees’ average ordinary hours 
worked per week should not exceed forty-five hours per week, or overtime of more than 
five hours a week on average.  The advantage of such model to employers is that it 
provides medium term flexibility to firms where there are fluctuations in demand for 
work on monthly or seasonal bases81. The disadvantage of the averaging system to an 
employee is that it reduces an employee’s period of overtime which is usually paid for. 
 
2.2.1.2 Night work and Shift work  
                
 Night work82 was first regulated in South Africa by the 1983 BCEA.83 Night work can 
be performed if agreed (S17) by the parties either individually or collectively. Although 
the Act provides for the payment of an allowance for night workers, it does not stipulate 
the amount but, leaves it for the parties to agree upon.84 
Although the law regulates shift work, it does allow the number of shifts to be regulated 
contractually by the parties. Furthermore, whether the shifts are organised during the day 
or at night is left to the discretion of the parties.  
 
From the above one realises that the standard working time model has greatly been 
altered so as to meet the needs of the employer. 
 
 
                                                 
81 Du Toit, D et al, Labour Relations Law, a Comprehensive Guide (2006) p525. 
82 Section 17 (1) BCEA defines “night work” to mean work performed after 18h00 and before 06h00 
83 The Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act 22 0f 1941 prohibited night work by women but such 
provision was repealed by the 1983 BCEA 
84 The Green Paper, however, proposed an allowance of 20 % of the employees’ remuneration. 
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2.2.2    Variation of Ordinary Hours of Work 
 
The BCEA regulates working time by setting the maximum hours an employee is 
supposed to work per week and per day (ss9 a,b and c), as well as the premium for work 
done during the night and for overtime work (s10). These provisions (s9 and s10), 
however, are not hard and fast rules as the Act gives room for these legislative provisions 
to be varied and thereby archieve flexibility. Variation of some of the legislative norms 
with regard to working time arrangements can be obtained by agreement between the 
parties, collective agreement or Ministerial determination. 
 
2.2.2.1  Agreement85 between the parties 
With regard to working time, s 9(2) permits parties to extend the ordinary hours of work 
for up to fifteen (15) minutes a day and not more than sixty (60) minutes a week in the 
case of employees serving members of the public to enable them continue work after the 
completion of  the ordinary hours of work . 
Section10 (3) and s16 (3) on their part allow the parties to agree for equivalent pay time 
off, rather than payment at a premium rate for overtime work and Sunday work. 
 
2.2.2.2 Written agreement 
Section 15 (2) allow the parties to reduce the daily rest period to ten hours for employees 
who live on the premises of the workplace. Section 14 (5) allows the parties to reduce the 
meal interval. While S 10 (4) (b) allows the parties to extend the period for equivalent 
pay time off for overtime and Sunday work. 
 
2.2.2.3 Collective agreement 
The 2002 amendment of the BCEA gives employers and registered unions the power to 
extend weekly maximum overtime hours from ten to fifteen hours a week provided it 
does not apply for more than two months in any twelve month period {s10 (6) (b).} 
Section 10(3) permits the parties to agree on equivalent paid time off rather than payment 
at a premium rate for overtime work and Sunday work. 
                                                 
85 “Agreement” in this sense includes a verbal agreement 
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2.2.2.4 Bargaining council agreements 
A collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council can replace, exclude or alter 
any basic condition of employment provided it is inline with the aims of the BCEA86 and 
does not reduce the protection afforded by the “core rights”.87 
 
2.2.2.4 Ministerial Determination 
The Minister has been given the power to vary certain basic standards laid down in 
chapter two of the Act on working hours taking into consideration health and safety of 
certain categories of employees (s13), to exclude certain categories of employees from 
working time protection, and to deem some categories of workers as employees (ss 6 (c), 
19 and 28). 
 
2.3  Wage Flexibility 
 
Here the focus is on how wage regulation is being arranged and the extent to which such 
regulation provides for flexibility. Before going to examine how flexibility has been built 
into wage regulation, it should be noted that the BCEA does not set a national minimum 
wage that applies to all the sectors. Wages are usually set by collective agreements or 
Ministerial Determination for those sectors where no collective agreement exist. 
  
2.3.1 Wage Flexibility and Collective Bargaining 
 
Section 1 (d) (ii) of the LRA promotes centralised bargaining as part of its objectives 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment of which wage arrangement is part. 
Flexibility in wage arrangement in such centralised forums will be examined with due 
regard to the extent to which such forums give room for supplementary wage negotiation 
                                                 
86 The aims of the BCEA which is to advance economic development and social justice , s2 
87 The core rights as in s49 (1) include: a 45 hour working week, an employers obligation to arrange 
working time with due regards to the health and safety and family responsibility of the employee, the 
protection of the health and safety of night workers, maternity and sick leave entitlement, minimum of two 
weeks annual leave, the prohibition of child labour and the regulation made by the minister with regard to 
maximum permitted hours of work and in the interest of health and safety. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
at plant level, and the extent to which provide for exemption from application of the 
sector wide agreements. All things being equal, an employer is not supposed to pay less 
that what has been collectively agreed. However, he is allowed to pay more than the 
agreed rate. The above proposition that an employer cannot pay less than the collectively 
agreed rate acts like a limit to the notion of flexibility and at the same time shows that it 
is flexibility in one direction88- an upward trend.  
 
 
2.3.1.1  Exemption from application of sector wage wide norm at company level 
Section 30 (1) (f) of the LRA requires a bargaining council constitution to provide for a 
procedure for exemption from bargaining council agreements. This means that an 
employer in a bargaining council or one who is not a member but to whom a collective 
agreement has been extended in terms of s 32 has the right to apply for exemption so as 
not to be bound by a minimum wage rate and other working conditions adopted in the 
council. Where such exemption is granted, the employer will have the right to bargain 
with employees at company level to determine wage levels which may be lower than 
those concluded in the bargaining council. One sees flexibility built into the system, of 
not being bound by collective agreements concluded at sectoral level through the 
exemption mechanism. In most cases, exemptions from council agreement are usually 
granted to small firms.89An exemption may be full, partial or temporary90. 
 
2.3.1.2 Additional bargaining at plant level 
Some bargaining council’s agreements contain clause which permits plant level 
bargaining to determine wage rates and other working conditions. In such instances, 
minimum wage rates are usually set at central level while actual wage rates are negotiated 
at plant level. The leather bargaining council, for example, permits such additional 
bargaining at company level91 .Downward variation can be accepted in circumstances 
                                                 
88 Cheadle in Hayster, S et al  ” Regulated Flexibility; The Impact of South African Labour Law and 
Labour Market Policy in a Global Context” (2000) p10 
89 Du Toit et al op cit p282. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Godfrey, S. et al ‘The State of Collective Bargaining in South Africa, an Empirical and Conceptual Study 
of Collective Bargaining” (2007) Development Policy Research Unit       
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where the minimum wage set at sectoral level may cause an employer substantial 
detriment. The national Motor Industry Bargaining Council for the automobile industry gives 
room for such variation from sector wide arrangements.92 
 
 
2.3.2       Wage Flexibility and Minimum Wage Standards 
 
Under South African law the BCEA does not lay down minimum wages but gives room 
for the Minister of Labour to set down such minimum wages through Sectoral 
Determinations93 in terms of s 55 (4) . 
Minimum wages are usually set for those groups of workers who by the very nature of 
their job lack the skill and strength to bargain effectively with the employer94 or in those 
sectors that are unorganised or where no  collective agreement applies. In making such 
determination the Minister is expected to take into account the peculiarity of each 
sector95; the result of such an approach is that, as in wages set through collective 
agreement, different minimum wage rates apply in the various sectors of the economy.   
 
Flexibility in minimum wage rates has also been achieved by allowing departures from 
sectoral determinations. Section 55 (5) of the BCEA states that a sectoral determination 
may apply to all or some employers or employee in a particular sector. This means that 
an employer or employees may apply to be exempted from a sectoral determination from 
the Minister under certain circumstances. Furthermore, an employer may make upward 
variations with regard to minimum wages. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 Ibid.  
93 Du Toit et al. op cit Sectoral Determinations have come to replace the wage determination in terms of the 
Wage Act p524. 
94 Rychroft et al op cit. p311f. 
95 Some of the sectors in which minimum wages have been set by the Minister include the transport sector, 
the private security sector, domestic workers sector. 
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2.4 Termination of employment. 
 
Globalisation has resulted in fierce competition amongst firms. This competition has 
resulted in the need for constant adaptation, which at times may lead to the dismissal of 
employees. Section 188 (1) of the LRA gives employers the right to terminate the 
services of employees when operational needs96 require. Thus, it will be fair for an 
employer to dismiss employees to increase efficiency, competitiveness and profitability. 
Barriers to the dismissal of employees, when operational requirements dictate, will not 
only discourage employers from increasing their workforce and make others 
uncompetitive, but can also increase labour costs. 
 
The law has made it possible for firms to easily hire workers during peak periods and fire 
them when demand declines. To this end, it is possible for a firm to resort to fixed-term 
contracts97 and hire employees during peak periods and state in the contract form that 
there is no expectation of renewal. Such a provision will be taken into account by the 
court in a dismissal claim. However, to protect the interests of employees’, s186 (1) (b) of 
the LRA regards the non-renewal of a fixed-term contract or renewal on different terms 
as dismissal when the employee expected renewal on the same or similar terms. The 
limitation on the use of fixed term contracts is that an employer cannot retrench 
employees on fixed-term contracts for operational reasons98.   It should however be noted 
that globalisation did not lead to the emergence of fixed-term contracts, it has rather led 
to the frequent use of such contract as a means of obtaining flexibility in the labour 
market99. 
 
Furthermore, the law does not prohibit an employer from employing casual workers on 
separate one day contracts or   to work only on week-ends or special shifts100. Thus, an 
employee who has been employed for such a short period can not claim dismissal. 
                                                 
96 Section 213 of the LRA defines operational needs as economic, structural or similar needs of an 
employer. 
97 This is a contract in which the duration is determined in advance by agreement of the parties. 
98 Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board (2004) 25 ILJ 2317 (LAC). 
99 Cheadle in Hayster, S et al op cit p9. 
100 Ibid. 
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It is evident from what has been discussed to this point, that the advent of globalisation 
has meant the gradual erosion of working conditions of employees under the pretext of 
keeping local firms competitive in the global market. First, the distortion of the standard 
working time model has meant that employees will under certain circumstances have to 
work Sundays as well as some overtime work without receiving any premium, but 
equivalent paid time off. Furthermore, the drive towards a flexible working environment 
has also been accompanied by laws which make it easier for employees to be dismissed.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
            COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP 
 
Kahn-Freund had been acute in noticing the inequality of power in a bargaining context 
when he said that the power relationship between an employer and an employee in a 
sector context is “typically a relationship between a bearer of power and one who is not a 
bearer of power”.101 From this standpoint, the main function of labour law was to ensure 
that there exists some degree of equality of power exists between the bargaining partners.   
 
 Generally, globalisation has been accompanied by moves towards deregulation and 
decollectivisation of the labour market with the aim of creating a business friendly 
environment and, consequently, attracting foreign investors. The effect of such moves has 
weakened trade union power in the bargaining forum and consequently constituted a 
challenge to the traditional function of labour law. This chapter examines the framework 
of collective bargaining102 and trade union membership in South Africa in an era of 
globalisation.  
 
   3.1 Collective Bargaining 
 
  3.1.1   Framework of Collective Bargaining  
The quest for labour market reforms and deregulation in the face of globalisation 
has been noted. The re-entry of South Africa into the global market in the mid 1990s 
was accompanied by steps by the newly elected government to reform the labour market. 
In carrying out this reform it was guided by the principle of regulated flexibility as 
developed by Paul Benjamin103. 
 
 
                                                 
101 D, Du Toit, “What is the Future of Collective Bargaining and Labour Law” (2007) 28 ILJ 1405 p 1406. 
102 Collective bargaining can be defined as a process whereby employers or employers organisations 
negotiate with employee representative to reach agreement on terms and conditions of employment. 
103 Cheadle, H. “Regulated Flexibility; Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA” (2006) 27 ILJ 663 
 p668. 
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3.1.1.1   A constitutional right to collective bargaining 
The Constitution in s 23 (5) entrenches the right to engage in collective bargaining 
premised on the notion of “fairness”104. The constitutional right to engage in collective 
bargaining should not be interpreted as a duty to bargain. Thus, the constitutional right to 
engage in collective bargaining should be interpreted to mean freedom to, as opposed to a 
positive right to, bargain105; this line of reasoning is supported by the fact that s23 (5) 
envisages that it will be the duty of the legislature to determine “the form, process, 
institution and the complex balance of power that forms part of any collective bargaining 
regime”.106 
 
3.1.1.2 A voluntarist approach to bargaining 
The LRA clearly promotes a voluntary system of collective bargaining without restoring 
the historical form of a duty to bargain at times imposed by the industrial courts107under 
the previous LRA. Although voluntary, the legislator has designed means through which 
either an employer or employee can be brought to the bargaining table. This has been 
done in the Act by entrenching union organisation in the workplace (ss 11to 16), the right 
to strike as well as the right to lock-out (s64). 
 
3.1.1.3 Levels of bargaining 
With regard to the level of bargaining, the current LRA designed a two tier system of 
bargaining: it provides an organisational platform for bargaining at workplace level as 
well as structures for bargaining at the level of the industry (sectoral level). Under the 
previous LRA such coherence in bargaining levels was never well established. In 
enforcing the duty to bargain the question was whether a court could order bargaining at 
plant level in preference to industry level. The court concluded that in the absence of 
                                                 
104 Section 23 (1) of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa states that “Every one has the right to fair labour 
practice”. 
105 SANDU v. Minister of Defence & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 1495 . 
106 Du Toit et al op cit p244. 
107 Du Toit, D “What Is the Future of Collective Bargaining and Labour Law” (2007) ILJ 1405  p1419. The 
industrial courts at the time imposed a duty to bargain in cases where it deemed it was fair that this should 
occur. FAWU V Spekenham (1998) 9 ILJ 628 (IC). 
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unfairness the choice of bargaining level should be left for the parties to decide108. Thus, 
where both parties were members of an industrial council and had the opportunity of 
bargaining, it was not unfair for one party to refuse to bargain at plant level109. However, 
where a trade union was not a member of a bargaining council but was not sufficiently 
representative of employees in a bargaining unit, it was unfair to refuse to bargain at plant 
level110. The current LRA allows for the level of bargaining to be determined by the 
parties in the absence of a duty to bargain111. The Act promotes centralised bargaining 
with multiple employers within a sector (s1 (d) (ii)), over plant level bargaining by 
granting enormous benefits to employers and unions who are members of a bargaining 
council. The Act encourages centralised bargaining through various means, such as: 
 a) Trade unions that are party to a bargaining council are automatically entitled to access 
and stop order rights in all the workplaces within the bargaining council’s jurisdiction 
irrespective of their representativity (s19)  
b) Councils have the power to determine by collective agreement matters which may not 
be an issue in dispute for the purpose of industrial action (s19)  
c) Bargaining council agreements may vary minimum conditions of employment (s49 
BCEA). 
To this end, the LRA provides for the establishment of bargaining councils (s27)112 and 
statutory councils (s39).113 In promoting collective bargaining over individual 
employment contracting, the Act provides for the extension (s32) of a collective 
agreement to non-members of a council within the sector. 
                                                 
108 Besaans du Plessis (Pretoria Foundries) (Pty) Ltd v. NUSAW (1990) 11 ILJ 690 (LAC). 
109 PPWAWU v SA Printing and Allied Industries Federation (1990) 11 ILJ 345 (IC). 
110 UAMAWU v S Thompson ( Pty) Ltd (1988) 9 ILJ 266 (IC). 
111 Du Toit et al op cit p 234 . 
112  Section 27 of the LRA provides that a bargaining council can be established when one or more trade 
unions and employer organisations agree on its establishment in a particular sector. 
113 As per s 39 of the LRA, such councils are formed when a representative trade union or employer 
organisation applied for its formation in those sectors where there is no bargaining council. The Minister of 
Labour may compel parties to be members of a statutory council and as such force them to bargain; hence, 
statutory council is an exception to the rule that bargaining cannot be compelled. 
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The LRA promotes collective bargaining and the observance of International Labour 
Organisation Convention 87 1948 and Convention 98 on The Right to Organise and 
Bargain Collectively114.  
 
3.1.1.4 Bargaining conduct 
As pointed out earlier, the LRA unlike the Industrial Court does not impose a duty to 
bargain. However, the Act’s objective of orderly collective bargaining implies that 
bargaining should take place in good faith. Furthermore,  good faith bargaining could 
also be secured by granting to unions the right of access to the employers’ premises (s 12) 
and also the right to disclosure of information (s16) 115 during consultation and collective 
bargaining s16 (3).  The duty to disclose, albeit having its limits,116 requires that the 
employer to disclose to a representative trade union all relevant information that will 
allow the union to engage in effective  bargaining, even though the parties are not obliged 
to arrive at an agreement. Under the previous LRA, the duty to disclose was an element 
of the right to good faith bargaining117 and ceased to operate when there is a deadlock in 
the bargaining forum. Conversely, under the current Act, the duty to disclose may extend 
beyond a formal bargaining deadlock except in circumstances where further disclosure 
will have no impact on finding a lasting solution118. 
 
 
   3.1.2 Collective Bargaining In an Era of Globalisation 
  
Globalisation has had significant impact on collective bargaining structures. 
Globalisation has led to the fragmentation of the production process across national 
boundaries.119 At times the fragmentation of business units may take the form of 
externalisation whereby the non-core functions of a company are outsourced to satellite 
                                                 
114 Convention 98 was ratified by South Africa in 1996. 
115 Ibid. p235. 
116 An employer is not supposed to disclose information that is legally privileged,(s16 (5)(a)), private 
information concerning an employees except the employee consent to its disclosure (16 (5) (c) ), that is 
confidential and if disclosed will cause substantial harm to an employee or employer (16 (5) (d)) 
117 MAWU v Natal Die Castings Co (Pty) Ltd (1986) 7 ILJ 520 (IC). 
118 Du Toit et al. op cit p 240.  
119 Dickens Global Shift 3rd ed p9.  
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companies and as such dismantles the workplace into smaller self-contained business 
units, separated from the mother plant. This decentralised system of work organisation 
has had a significant impact on collective bargaining; the demarcation of an industrial 
union has become increasingly difficult. For instance, in a mining operation, security, 
drilling, catering and cleaning which were previously seen as part of the mining operation 
have been outsourced to satellite companies to provide the services to the mother plant. 
The end result of such a scenario is that union bargaining power has severely been 
weakened due to the fact that organising workers to join a union has become  
increasingly difficult. 
 
 Although the LRA favours centralised bargaining, the cold wind of globalisation has 
undermined the institution of centralised bargaining. This partially explains the decline in 
bargaining coverage in the private sector. Bargaining at the central level gives union 
greater leverage as they are able to represent a larger number of workers120. Bargaining at 
company level, on the other hand, gives room for flexibility for employers as they are not 
bound by the terms and conditions of employment concluded at the central level except in 
cases where such agreements have been extended. 
 
 3.1.3) Extent Collective Bargaining Coverage 
 
Notwithstanding the above stated impact of globalisation on collective bargaining, 
collective bargaining in South Africa seems to be on the increase121. This is a strange 
phenomenon given the fact that union membership is on the decline122 . One would have 
expected that the decline in union density will also signify a decline in collective 
bargaining. However, the number of employees covered by bargaining council 
                                                 
120 Du Toit, D “The Right To Engage in Collective Bargaining” 
http://elearn.uwc.ac.za/index.php?module=context&nodeid=gen15Srv44Nme26_8573&action=content. 
(Extracted on 15- 09- 2009). 
121  Du Toit, D. “What Is the Future of Collective Bargaining (and Labour Law) in South Africa” (2007) 28 
ILJ 1405 p1420. 
122 Ibid.  
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agreements has increased from 15 % (approximately 1.2 million workers) in 1995 to 32 
% (about 2.5 million workers) in 2005.123. Many reasons account for its increase in. 
 
The most important reason for the increase in collective bargaining in South African has 
to the extension of collective bargaining to the public sector and the institutional support 
for compulsory bargaining in terms of the creation of the Public Service Coordinating 
Bargaining Council, unlike in the private sector where there is no such organ.  
 
The extension mechanism has also played a minimal role in increasing the rate of 
collective bargaining. The LRA creates room for the extension of bargaining council 
agreements to non- members of a council within a sector. The reason for extending such 
agreement is to prevent unfair competition within an industry and also to use the 
extension mechanism as a tool to achieve centralised bargaining124 The percentage of 
employees covered by extended agreements stands at approximately 4.6 %125. 
 
However, if one has to remove the percentage of employees covered by collective 
bargaining in the public sector, one would realise that the extent of collective bargaining 
in the private sector has witnessed a decline from an estimated level of 15 % employees  
in 1995126 to 13 % employees in 2005127: thus an estimated decline of  about 2% 
employees from 1995-2005. The decline in collective bargaining in the private sector is, 
however, being mitigated by the fact that the BCEA applies to all employees and sectoral 
determinations promulgated to protect vulnerable workers play a major role in 
determining wages and working conditions of employees.128 
 
 
                                                 
123 Bhorat, H. et al “Analyzing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market; The Role of 
Bargaining Councils” (2009) Development Policy Research Unit p26. 
 
124 Du Toit et al, op cit p279 . 
125 Finnemore, M. Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa 2006  p176 . 
126 Bhorat, H. op cit. Prior to 1994 no formal bargaining took place in the public sector. Conditions of work 
were determined by a commission. p15. 
127 Bhorat, H. (2009) op cit. 
128 Finnemore, M. op cit p 177. 
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3.2 Trade Union Membership 
During the 1980s and 1990s, trade union membership in South Africa witnessed an 
unprecedented rise129. The reason for such a speedy increase was as a result of the 
deracialisation of the industrial relations system and also the extension of trade union 
rights to public sector employees130. 
 This sharp increase in union membership slowed down in the last half of the 1980s and 
by 1993 unionisation in the private sector started experiencing a downtrend, with the 
union density rate standing at about 34 % workers in 1999131; a record contraction of  24 
% compared to the unionisation rate of the first quarter of the 1980s. Trade union 
membership declined from 3 939 075 members in 2001 to 2 935 864 members in 
2005132- a record loss of 1003211 members. 
 
3.2.1 Reasons for the decline in trade union membership 
 
 This decline in union membership has been the result of structural, cyclical and 
institutional factors. 
 
3.2.1.1 Structural factors 
Structural changes in the economy, such as, the emergence of non-standard employment 
as a result of the fragmentation of the production process, coupled with the growth of the 
service sector, which is not union friendly, to the detriment of other sectors which were 
comparatively friendly to union activities in terms of organising workers, have negatively 
impacted on union membership133.  
 
3.2.1.2 Cyclical factors 
                                                 
129 Kaia, P , et al. ‘Impact of Globalisation on Industrial Relations on Europe and other Major Economies’ 
European foundation for the improvement of living and working condition. (2007) p14 
130  
131 Bhorat, H. et al.  “The South African labour market in a Globalising world; Economic and Legislative 
Consideration” (2002). 
 
132 D, Du Toit. op cit p 1420. 
133 Ibid. p1412.  
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Cyclical factors134 are also impacting on trade union membership. It should be noted that 
South African firms faced stiff competition from international firms as a result of the 
liberalisation of the economy. The impact of such competion is that some domestic firms 
find it difficult to survive in the face of global competition and thus have no other option 
than to close up or retrench some workers so as to reduce labour costs. It is common 
knowledge that an unemployed person cannot be a trade union member. Examples of 
trade unions which lost membership as a result of unemployment are the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) and National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA), in whose 
industries large scale retrenchments 135 had taken place. 
 
3.1.2.3 Institutional factors 
Some legislative provisions, such as, the deduction of union membership136 dues and the 
voluntary system of bargaining, have had adverse effects on union membership. Tighter 
regulations governing the registration of trade unions also explain the reason for the 
decline in trade union membership.137 
 
From the foregoing it can be seen that the advent of globalisation has been accompanied 
by the erosion of the institution of centralised bargaining as well as trade union 
membership. Albeit that there is  institutional support for a system of centralised 
bargaining, which gives unions greater leverage and grants them the opportunity to 
represent greater numbers of employees, the impact of globalisation on bargaining 
institutions has undermined such intended outcome as seen in the decline in the extent of 
collective  bargaining. This outcome shows that the present legislative framework which 
favours centralised bargaining is unsustainable or at odds with globalisation. Thus, new 
avenues need to be explored under which terms and conditions of employment will be 
negotiated other than at the sectoral level. The present legal framework of workplace 
forums is not a suitable one as it is limited only to production related matters. 
 
                                                 
134 “Cyclical factors” refers to the so  impact of unemployment on trade union membership. 
135 Woo, G.”South African Trade Unions in a Time of Adjustment” (2001). 
http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/llt/47/06wood.html  (accessed on 08/ 03/ 2009). 
136 D, Du Toit. Op cit p 1413. 
137 Kaia, P, et al. op cit. p 15. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Public Sector Arrangements 
 
Just as in the private sector, globalisation has pushed the government to carry out reforms 
in the public sector so as to reduce the size, and cost of, and consequently increase 
efficiency in, the public sector. South Africa’s restructuring programme resulted in 
structural changes in employment patterns in the public sector. The main reason for this 
is the introduction of private sector corporate management techniques in the running of 
the public sector138 in place of the bureaucratic model.  
 
Prior to 1993 labour relations laws were applicable only to employers and employees in 
the private sector, while those in the public sector were excluded from the Act. Terms 
and conditions of employment of those in the public sector were unilaterally determined 
by the employer (the state).139 The restructuring of the public sector with the advent of 
globalisation resulted in the extension rights similar to those enjoyed by employees and 
employers of the private sector to their counterparts in the public sector140. A good 
example is the right to collective bargaining. Thus, in 1993 several pieces of labour 
legislation were passed to regulate labour relations in the public sector: the Public Service 
Labour Relations Act and the Education Labour Relations Act141. In 1995 these various 
pieces of legislation which governed employees in the public sector were abolished and 
the Labour Relations Act of 1995 came into force which covered all categories of 
employees previously excluded or governed in terms of other legislation.142 As will be 
seen, although governed under the same laws, the impact of globalisation with regard to 
                                                 
138 Van Der Walt, L et al “ Globalisation And The Outsourced University In South Africa: The 
Restructuring Of Support Services In The Public Sector Universities In South Africa, 1994- 2004” (2002)   
139 Patel, I. in Adler, G et al Public Service Labour Relations in a Democratic South Africa  p129  
140 Du Plessis, JV et al  A Practical Guide To Labour Law .(2000)  p389  
141 The Public Service Labour Relations Act of 1993 regulated labour relations in the public service while 
the Education Labour Relations Act of 1993 regulated labour relations in the education sector. 
142 Section 2 of the LRA states that the Act does not apply to employees of the National Defence Force, 
National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Services. Employees such as those in the south 
African police force and the parliamentary service do not have the right to strike but have the right to 
engage in collective bargaining because they fall under the category of those providing “essential service”. 
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work regulation in the public sector shows differences to that of the private sector 
especially with regard to bargaining outcomes. 
 
4.1 Globalisation and the Emergence of Atypical Employment in the Public Sector 
 
Employment patterns in South Africa’s public sector, as in the private sector, were based 
on the standard permanent fulltime employment with one employer. However, the re-
entry of the country into the global economy was accompanied by the restructuring of the 
public sector. The state restructuring programme of the public sector led to change in the 
size, role and functions of the state. Measures, such as, the privatisation of state owned 
enterprises as well as commercialisation143  of state entities, were implemented so as to 
reduce the size of the public sector, reduce public expenditure, increase efficiency, and, 
consequently, curb the budget deficit.144 The impact of privatisation and the use of non- 
standard employment patterns in the public sector has seen the sector losing about 200 
000 employees from 1995 to 2000145. Today employment patterns in the public sector 
mirror those of the private sector; a mixture of standard fulltime employment and the use 
of non-standard employment arrangements.  
 
4.1.1 Externalisation (outsourcing) in the public sector 
Under the process of outsourcing, the non-core functions of the public sector are 
contracted out to private firms while the public entity focuses on its core activity. This 
trend is driven by the desire for a smaller public sector as a result of a decline in finance 
due to contraction in government subsidies.146 Unlike in the private sector where 
employers resort to outsourcing as a means of avoiding the responsibilities associated 
with being an employer, outsourcing in the public sector is motivated by the desire for 
efficiency and of course the move towards the commercialisation of the public sector147. 
                                                 
143Finnemore, M. Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa (2006) Butterworth p152. 
“Commercialisation “ is a process whereby public entities are designed to operate in a commercial manner, 
and usually involves the transfer of government work to the private sector. 
144 Bodibe, O. “The Extend and Effect of Casualisation in Southern Africa; Analysis of Lesotho, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe” (2006) NALEDI p8. 
145 Pillay, D “Globalisation and the informalisation of Labour: the case of South Africa” p 7. 
146 Van der Walt,  L et al op cit p23. 
147 Ibid p13. 
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The sectors which have experienced the process of outsourcing include education, health-
care and public works. In the education and healthcare sectors, for example, support 
services, such as, cleaning and security, have been outsourced.148 The justification for this 
is that the core functions of, say, a hospital is to provide healthcare and thus will 
concentrate on providing just that. Outsourcing of the non-core functions is viewed as 
being cost effective compared to fulltime employment.149  
 
Outsourcing has negative effects on the working conditions of employees. First, working 
conditions of outsourced employees are comparatively poorer compared to when they 
where employed by the said public sector entity. Work security of employees of the 
outside service provider is usually less: declining work safety, lack of job security, and of 
course lack of trade union representation in the new company150 are common amongst 
employees of the outsourced entity. 
 
4.1.2 Casualisation  
The use of part-time and temporary workers is also prevalent in the public sector today. 
Individual employment contracting is also taking place in the public sector, such as the 
use of teachers in public owned institutions and the use of consultants. The public sector 
is also making use of fixed-term and temporary employment contracts. Fixed-term 
contracts are often resorted to when the public sector is experiencing fluctuating changing 
operational demands151. In the education sector, for example, there has been the 
increasing use of fixed-term contracts as a preferred option for recruiting lecturers.152  
Such contracts are usually negotiated with the individual employee. Temporary 
employment contracts, on the other hand, are used for short term and adhoc work 
requirements153, such as, the supply of stationery for offices. They are often resorted to as 
a result of budgetary constraints.  
 
                                                 
148 Bondibe, O. op cit p8, NEHAWU v University Of Cape Town (2003) BCLR 154 CC. 
149 Ibid. 
150  Van Der Walt,  L et al op cit p 29 
151 Erasmus, et al South African Human Resource Management For The Public Sector (2005) p 258,  
152  Van Der Walt,  L et al op cit p14. 
153 Erasmus et al op cit. 
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 4. 2 Collective Bargaining In the Public Sector  
 
Before looking at bargaining in the public sector, it would be important for us to note that 
before 1993 there was no formal bargaining in the public service: wages and working 
conditions were decreed by the central government154. The pre-1993 public service was 
fragmented into eleven government and four provincial administrations; each had 
separate provisions regulating labour relations within its jurisdiction155. Public 
administration at the time was modelled on a centralised system of personnel 
management: the powerful and independent Public Service Commission, which later 
became the Commission for Administration, was at the centre of the system156 and it 
decreed the terms and conditions of employment. 
 
The LRA entrenched centralised bargaining in the public sector with the provision of the 
Public Service Coordinating Bargaining Council (PSCBC) in s35 LRA. Unlike in the 
private sector where bargaining is voluntary, s36 (1) of the LRA obliges the creation of 
the PSCBC. The PSCBC is empowered to designate sectors in the public service for the 
establishment of a sectoral council (s37 (10). The PSCBC can conclude agreements on 
matters that apply across the public service, on terms and conditions of employment that 
apply to two or more sectors, and, finally, on matters that are assigned to the state as 
employer with regard to the entire public service and attributed to the state in any 
particular sector157. 
  
At the sectoral level, councils are designated by the PSCBC in line with its constitution. 
Each sectoral council is an independent body and has exclusive jurisdiction over matters 
that are peculiar to that sector (s37 (5)). Presently, four sectoral bargaining councils have 
been created in the public service: 
 The Education Labour Relations Council; 
 The Public Health and Welfare Sectoral Bargaining Council; 
                                                 
154Van Der Walt, L et al op cit. 
155 Ibid  p129. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Section 36. 
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 The Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council And; 
 The General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council. 
 
The PSCBC performs the functions of a bargaining council with regard to: matters 
relating to terms and conditions of employment that apply to two or more sectors; relating 
to uniform rules, and standards that apply across the public service; and finally matters 
that apply to the state as employer with regard to the public service as opposed to those 
assigned to the state as employer in a particular sector (s36 (2) LRA). Collective 
agreements concluded at the PSCBC bind the sectoral councils.  
 
4.3) Extent of collective bargaining and trade union membership. 
 
 4.3.1) Extent of Collective Bargaining  
Collective bargaining in the public sector, unlike in the private sector, has witnessed an 
increase. A study shows that collective bargaining for those in formal employment in 
1995 stood at about 15 % of employees, this figure, however, more than doubled by 2005 
to approximately 32 % of employees158. The reason for the increase in bargaining 
coverage is due to the extension of labour rights, especially the extension of the right to 
collective bargaining to employees and employers in the public sector. Of the 32% 
employees covered by bargaining councils agreements by 2005, 19 % of the employees 
were from the public sector, while the remaining 13 %  were from the private sector159.  
 
Another reason for this high rate of collective bargaining in the public sector in the face 
of a decline in the private sector is due to the fact that s37 of the LRA obliges the creation 
of the PSCBC, which acts as a forum for institutionalised bargaining in the public 
sector160, unlike in the private sector where there is no such body to facilitate bargaining. 
 
                                                 
158 Bhorat, H. et al “Analyzing Wage Formation in the South African Labour Market; The Role of 
Bargaining Councils” (2009) Development Policy Research Unit p26. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid p4. 
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Since collective bargaining remains the primary basis for wage setting in the public 
sector as opposed to the private sector, where collective bargaining as well as individual 
employment contracting is used as a base for wage setting, the result has been loss of 
wage relativity with the public sector. Public sector wages are relatively higher than those 
in the private sector161- the difference being as much as 90% more for those in public 
sector bargaining councils162. 
 
4.3.2 Trade Union Membership 
 
While private sector trade union membership is on the decline, the reverse seems to be 
the case with the unionisation rate in the public sector. Of the approximately 1.1 million 
employees in the public sector, 1.0 million are union members163- that is a unionisation 
rate of more than 90 %.  
 
The reason for the high rate of unionisation in the public sector is because of the fact that 
it is easier to organise workers in the public sector to join unions. Their workplaces are 
usually larger making it conducive for a higher rate of unionisation than in the private 
sector where the workplace is usually smaller164and in some cases fragmented. 
Furthermore, the fact that the employer is the State and has a duty to uphold the law165 is 
another reason for high union density in the public sector, unlike in the private sector in 
where employers may resort to various tactics to discourage employees from joining 
unions. Finally, the fact that employees here have relatively stable job also explain the 
reason for this high union membership.166 
 
Globalisation has resulted in a sea change in labour relations in South Africa’s public 
sector. The extension of labour rights to employees and employer in the public sector as 
                                                 
161 Ibid p 36. 
162 Ibid. 
163  Makgetla, N. op cit   http://www.cps.org.za/pol8.htm ( accessed on the 5/ o5/ 2009). 
164 Tregena, F “Contracting Out Of Service Activities and the Effects Of Sectoral Employment Pattern in 
South Africa” (2009) p12. 
165 Ibid p14. 
166 Bezuidenhout, A “Towards global social movement unionism? Trade union responses to globalisation in 
south Africa”  (2000) p13 
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well as the privatisation and commercialisation of state corporations have transformed 
labour relations in the public sector.  Furthermore, the drive towards a flexible working 
environment as a result of budgetary constraints has resulted in the use of standard and 
non-standard labour in the public sector. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS                                                             
 
From the above, one realises that globalisation has had a tremendous impact on work 
regulation and that assessing the extent and effect of such impact has not been easy. The 
one thing which is clear from the above is that it has led to flexibility in, and deregulation 
of, the labour market. This in turn has had unimaginable consequences on industrial 
relations in South Africa. The emergence of non-standard forms of workforce has put 
some categories of employees out of the regulatory net of labour law or, even if they are 
within its scope, they will need to prove that they are in fact employees, so as to benefit 
from the protection of labour law accorded to employees. Thus, it would be much wiser 
to examine mechanisms that can be used to curb the adverse effects of globalisation on 
employees while at the same time being mindful of employers’ needs if we need to 
remain part of the global economy. 
 
Trade union membership as seen in the private sector is experiencing a downward trend. 
This is largely due to the fragmentation of the production process across various sectors 
and the growth of atypical employment as a result of globalisation. Since unions draw 
their bargaining strength from their control of the labour force, the result of such decline 
is that unions’ bargaining position has become weakened. Thus, it will be better to look 
for ways through which unions can boost membership. One possible strategy for unions 
to use boost their membership is to disseminate information regarding their work so as to 
create trust amongst employees167 as well as educating members on the importance of 
joining unions and participating in their activities. This can be achieved through the 
publicsing of their work and its results, and also to organise press conferences to educate 
employees of their activities. 
 
                                                 
167 Karnite, R “Trade Union Seek to Boost Membership” (2006) 
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Collective bargaining in the private sector, as seen in the previous chapter, has 
contracted. This decline indicates that the system is moving more towards individual 
employment contracting. Such a move is not favourable to employees given the 
imbalance with regard to the power relationship that exists between an employer and an 
employee when it comes to negotiating terms and conditions of employment. Although 
the LRA favours a system of centralised bargaining, globalisation has come to undermine 
such centralised system, as seen in the decline collective bargaining coverage, albeit that 
there is institutional support for a centralised system of bargaining. This is due to the fact 
that employers in their quest for flexibility have rather resorted to plant level bargaining 
which is characterised in most cases by a drop in the number of employees covered by a 
collective agreement.  
 
The decline in collective bargaining, despite institutional support for centralised 
bargaining which normally is associated with a high rate of bargaining indicates that the 
law regulating the institution of collective bargaining needs to be overhauled. To achieve 
this, I recommend that the law regulating the institution of collective bargaining be 
amended so as to favour plant level bargaining, and so to align it with global practice. 
This could be achieved by amending the law regulating  workplace forums as provided 
for under the LRA, so as to give unions the power to be able to represent workers, and as 
such able to negotiate terms and conditions of employment. This will mean a 
transformation of a workplace forum from an organ which is limited to solving 
production related matters to one which will include negotiating terms and conditions of 
employment. 
Such a move will be beneficial to employers in that it will not only grant them the much 
desired flexibility which they need in order to be competitive in the global market, but 
will also mean that collective agreements will be concluded taking into consideration the 
specific needs of the company, which would not have been the case where agreements 
are concluded at central (sectoral) level. As regards the employees, such decentralised 
organs with regard to bargaining will meet the aspirations of those in non-standard 
employment patterns as their participation will be facilitated: since workplace forums 
promote the interests of all employees and not only union members.  
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At international level globalisation has resulted in the fragmentation of the production 
process across national boundaries. As a result of internationalisation of production 
patterns, employees’ power to bargain collectively has been greatly diminished as 
employers often threaten to relocate in those countries where labour is cheap. The 
transnational nature of some companies is also adversely affecting the bargaining power 
of employees.  To reduce such adverse impact, I recommend as another viable solution to 
the problem of declining collective bargaining that trade unions should reinforce their 
strategy on international collective bargaining. There are several steps that can be taken 
by trade unions in this regard168. The co-ordination of bargaining internationally between 
international trade union structures and international employer organisation should be 
promoted169. Framework agreements between multi-national companies (MNCs) and 
international trade union federations should be encouraged. Such international 
agreements between international trade unions and international employer organisation 
are commendable in today’s declining working conditions as a result of globalisation, 
because they oblige MNCs to respect most of the ILO core labour standards, guarantee 
certain rights to workers and even provide a mechanism for monitoring170. Such moves, if 
promoted by unions, I believe will further improve the working conditions of employees 
and will also discourage the behaviour of employers who threaten to relocate production 
units in those countries where bargaining is not adequately protected by the law or where 
union power is weak. 
 
In the first chapter it was seen that globalisation has led to the emergence of non-standard 
forms of employment which traditional labour law cannot adequately regulate. This 
problem is further compounded by the fact that it is difficult for those in atypical 
employment relationships to form and join trade unions that can defend their interests 
                                                 
168 Du Toit, D “What is the Future of Collective Bargaining (and Labour Law) in South Africa” (2005) 28 
ILJ 1405 p1429. 
169 Ibid. A good example of such collective agreement is the one signed between the International Transport 
Workers Federation and International Maritime Employers’ Committee. 
170 Ibid. 
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during the bargaining process171. In order to solve this problem i recommend that the 
LRA and the BCEA, be amended so that Sectoral Agreements or Ministerial 
Determinations go beyond the scope of contracts of employment to include those in work 
relationships which are “akin” to an employment relationship.  The criteria for extending 
such labour rights should be based on the personal and economically dependent nature of 
the service. Hence, to benefit from the protection of the law, the solution should not lie 
on the bipolar distinction between the common law contract of employment and the 
contract for service, but rather, the distinction between dependent workers and the self- 
employed (genuine independent contractors)172. The extension of labour rights beyond 
the contract of employment is in line with modern labour law practice, for example, in 
Germany where labour rights have been extended to “employee like work contracts”173. 
 
The designation of the TES as employer (s198 LRA) is problematic with regard to the 
protection of employees in such an employment relationship. Employees in such 
employment relationship find it difficult to exercise most of the rights174 accorded to 
employees in a standard employment relationship. To close this legislative loophole, I 
recommend that reforms be implemented so that every TES be registered.175 Such a 
process will not only facilitate the definition of a TES, but will also provide adequate 
information about them.  
Furthermore, the law relating to the granting of organisational rights contained in ss 12 
and 13 of the LRA needs to be reformed so that organisational rights are easily acquired 
                                                 
171 Cheadle, H “Regulated Flexibility, Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA”. (2006) 27ILJ P 702. It should 
be noted that to benefit from the protection of the law, an employee must prove  the existence of a contract 
of employment under the common law. However, the various contractual as well as institutional forms 
which atypical employment relationships take,  means  that they fall outside the scope of the common law 
contract of employment,  and as such cannot benefit from the protection of the law. Some do fall within the 
protective reach of the law, but the nature of the employment make it difficult for them to join a trade 
union. 
172 Cheadle, H et al  “South African Constitution, The Bill Of Rights” p18-6. 
173  Ibid p 18-4.  
174Theron, J. “Intermediary or Employer? Labour Broker and the Triangular Employment Relationship” 
(2005). ILJ. Examples of such rights include: the right not to unfairly dismiss; organisational rights; etc. 
The designation of the TES as an employers makes the exercise of such rights ineffective. 
175 Theron, J. “Intermediary or Employer? Labour Broker and the Triangular Employment Relationship” 
(2005). p646. It should be noted that the LRA does not require that TESs register, the only provision 
requiring those “providing employment services for gain” is under the Skills Development Act (SDA) 
1998.The purpose for registration under the SDA is not to regulate employment practice, but to regulate the 
activities and practice like the fees job seekers should be charged. 
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by those in a triangular employment relationship. The present state of affairs gives 
workers in a standard employment relation an advantage when it comes to the exercise of 
organisational rights. The rationale for this is that, if we go by the definition of a 
“workplace”,176 a TES cannot grant access to a trade union in the workplace where its 
employees work, because it is usually on the premises of the client where work is being 
done.177 Thus, reforms should be designed in such a way that the determining criteria for 
acquiring organisational rights for unions should be based on its membership in the 
workplace.178  
Finally, there is a need for a code of good practice with regard to the activities of TES179. 
Such code should be able to grant employees benefits, such as, entitlement to sick leave, 
family responsibility leave, etc. 
 
Another possible remedy to the problem of declining working conditions of employees in 
the face of globalisation could lie in the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR). It is a concept whereby multinational companies are called upon to accept their 
responsibility not only to their shareholders but also to their employees and the 
communities in which they operate180.To this end CSR guidelines such as the United 
Nations Global Compact and the ILO Tripartite Declaration, have been drawn up.  Some 
of these guidelines,  like the ILO Tripartite Declaration, contain clauses, inter alia, which 
encourage MNC to bargain with trade unions protecting the interest of their employees, 
as well as which require MNCs to provide workers’ organisations with all the facilities to 
enable them to engage in effective bargaining.181 Besides this, some companies have 
developed CSR rules for the conduct of their business activities. For example, Shell’s 
General Business Principles describe its obligations to its employees as amongst others:  
“To respect the human rights of employees and to provide them with good and safe 
working conditions, and competitive terms and conditions of employment”.  
                                                 
176 “Place or places were the employee of an employer works…” s213. 
177 Theron, op cit. p 647. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid p628. 
180  Du Toit, D. op cit p1429ff. 
181 Ibid p 1430. 
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From the foregoing CSR guidelines one can see that if implemented the working 
conditions of employees will be improved because such guidelines encourage the 
protection of employees’ interest. However, the voluntary nature of CSR rules means that 
where its principles are not adhered to by a particular MNC, no action can be taken 
against that corporation. However, CSR guidelines remain one of the major sources 
through which working conditions of employees can be improved given the fact that they 
require MNCs to provide more than what the laws stipulates. 
 
To conclude, the advent of globalisation has witnessed a call for labour market flexibility. 
The drive towards a flexible industrial relations system in South Africa has resulted in a 
sea change in labour regulation: in the private sector, collective bargaining is fast giving 
way to a system of individual employment contracting, on the one hand, and also a 
system which mixes standard and atypical employment patterns, on the other.  This is 
pointing towards a decline in both the extent of collective bargaining as well as trade 
union membership in the private sector. However, with remedial policies such as 
reforming the law governing the institution of collective bargaining to favour plant level 
bargaining, extending Ministerial Determinations or Sectoral Determinations to include 
work relationship which are “akin” to employment relationship, CSR rules etc, i believe 
that the protection of employees in an era of globalisation, characterised with declining 
working conditions, will be strengthened.  The picture in the public sector on its part is 
not that bleak: reforms in the sector have, unlike in the private sector led to an increase in 
the extent of bargaining. Also, the use of standard and non-standard employment pattern 
in the public sector has resulted to the emergence of public-private partnership. 
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